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Abstract
We introduce two tactics, namely the strategically-
timed attack and the enchanting attack, to attack
reinforcement learning agents trained by deep re-
inforcement learning algorithms using adversarial
examples. In the strategically-timed attack, the ad-
versary aims at minimizing the agent’s reward by
only attacking the agent at a small subset of time
steps in an episode. Limiting the attack activity
to this subset helps prevent detection of the at-
tack by the agent. We propose a novel method
to determine when an adversarial example should
be crafted and applied. In the enchanting attack,
the adversary aims at luring the agent to a desig-
nated target state. This is achieved by combining a
generative model and a planning algorithm: while
the generative model predicts the future states, the
planning algorithm generates a preferred sequence
of actions for luring the agent. A sequence of ad-
versarial examples are then crafted to lure the agent
to take the preferred sequence of actions. We ap-
ply the proposed tactics to the agents trained by the
state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning algo-
rithm including DQN and A3C. In 5 Atari games,
our strategically-timed attack reduces as much re-
ward as the uniform attack (i.e., attacking at every
time step) does by attacking the agent 4 times less
often. Our enchanting attack lures the agent toward
designated target states with a more than 70% suc-
cess rate. Example videos are available at http:
//yclin.me/adversarial_attack_RL/.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs), which can extract hierarchi-
cal distributed representations from signals, are established as
the de facto tool for pattern recognition, particularly for su-
pervised learning. We, as a generation, have witnessed a trend
of fast adoption of DNNs in various commercial systems per-
forming image recognition [Krizhevsky et al., 2012], speech
recognition [Hannun et al., 2014], and natural language pro-
cessing [Sutskever et al., 2014] tasks. Recently, DNNs have
also started to play a central role in reinforcement learning
(RL)—a field of machine learning research where the goal is
to train an agent to interact with the environment for maxi-
mizing its reward. The community has realized that DNNs
are ideal function approximators for classical RL algorithms,
because DNNs can extract reliable patterns from signals for
constructing a more informed action determination process.
For example, [Mnih et al., 2015] use a DNN to model the
action–value function in the Q-learning algorithm, and [Mnih
et al., 2016] use a DNN to directly model the policy. Rein-
forcement learning research powered by DNNs is generally
referred to as deep reinforcement learning (Deep RL).
However, a constant question lingers while we enjoy using
DNNs for function approximation in RL. Specifically, since
DNNs are known to be vulnerable to the adversarial example
attack [Szegedy et al., 2014], as a deep RL agent inherits the
pattern recognition power from a DNN, does it also inherit
its vulnerability to the adversarial examples? We believe the
answer is yes and provide empirical evidence in the paper.
Adversarial attack on deep RL agents is different from
adversarial attack on classification system in several ways.
Firstly, an RL agent interacts with the environment through
a sequence of actions where each action changes the state of
the environment. What the agent received is a sequence of
correlated observations. For an episode of L steps, an adver-
sary can determine whether to craft an adversarial example to
attack the agent at each time step (i.e. there are 2L choices).
Secondly, an adversary to deep RL agents have different goals
such as reducing the final rewards of agents or malevolently
lure agents to dangerous states, which is different to an adver-
sary to classification system that aims at lowering classifica-
tion accuracy. In this paper, we focus on studying adversarial
attack specific on deep RL agents. We argue this is important.
As considering deep RL agents for controlling machines, we
need to understand the vulnerability of the agents because
it would limit their use in mission-critical tasks such as au-
tonomous driving. Based on [Kurakin et al., 2016], which
showed that adversarial examples also exist in the real world,
an adversary can add maliciously-placed paint to the surface
of a traffic stop to confuse an autonomous car. How could we
fully trust deep RL agents if their vulnerability to adversarial
attacks is not fully understood and addressed?
In a contemporary work, [Huang et al., 2017] proposes an
adversarial attack tactic where the adversary attacks a deep
RL agent at every time step in an episode. We refer to such a
tactic as the uniform attack and argue it is preliminary. First,
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the uniform attack ignores the fact that the observations are
correlated. Moreover, the spirit of adversarial attack is to ap-
ply a minimal perturbation to the observation to avoid detec-
tion. If the adversary perturbs the observation at every time
instance, it is more likely to be detected. A more sophisti-
cated strategy would be to attack at selective time steps. For
example, as shown in Fig. 1, attacking the deep RL agent
has no consequence when the ball is far away from the pad-
dle. However, when the ball is close to the paddle, attacking
the deep RL agent could cause it to drop the ball. There-
fore, the adversarial attacks at different time instances are not
equally effective. Based on this observation, we propose the
strategically-timed attack, which takes into account the num-
ber of times an adversarial example is crafted and used. It
intends to reduce the reward with as fewer adversarial exam-
ples as possible. An adversarial example is only used when
the attack is expected to be effective. Our experiment results
show that an adversary exercising the strategically-timed at-
tack tactic can reduce the reward of the state-of-the-art deep
RL agents by attacking four times less often as comparing to
an adversary exercising the uniform attack tactic.
In addition, we propose the enchanting attack for mali-
ciously luring a deep RL agent to a certain state. While the
strategically-timed attack aims at reducing the reward of a
deep RL agent, the enchanting attack aims at misguiding the
agent to a specified state. The enchanting attack can be used
to mislead a self-driving car controlled by a deep RL agent
to hit a certain obstacle. We implement the enchanting attack
using a planning algorithm and a deep generative model. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first planning-based ad-
versarial attack on a deep RL agent. Our experiment results
show that the enchanting attack has a more than 70% success
rate in attacking state-of-the-art deep RL agents.
We apply our adversarial attack to the agents trained by
state-of-the-art deep RL algorithms including A3C [Mnih et
al., 2016] and DQN [Mnih et al., 2015] on 5 Atari games. We
provide examples to evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks.
We also compare the robustness of the agents trained by the
A3C and DQN algorithms to these adversarial attacks. The
contributions of the paper are summarized below:
• We study adversarial example attacks on deep RL agents
trained by state-of-the-art deep RL algorithms including
A3C and DQN.
• We propose the strategically-timed attack aiming at at-
tacking a deep RL agent at critical moments.
• We propose the enchanting attack (the first planning-
based adversarial attack) aiming at maliciously luring an
agent to a certain state.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the vul-
nerability of deep RL agents to the two attacks.
2 Related Work
Following [Szegedy et al., 2014], several adversarial exam-
ple generation methods were proposed for attacking DNNs.
Most of these methods generated an adversarial example via
seeking a minimal perturbation of an image that can confuse
the classifier (e.g., [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al.,
2016]). [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016] first estimated linear
decision boundaries between classes of a DNN in the image
space and iteratively shifted an image toward the closest of
these boundaries for crafting an adversarial example.
While the existence of adversarial examples to DNNs has
been demonstrated several times on various supervised learn-
ing tasks, the existence of adversarial examples to deep RL
agents has remained largely unexplored. In a contempo-
rary paper, [Huang et al., 2017] proposed the uniform attack,
which attacks a deep RL agent with adversarial examples at
every time step in an episode for reducing the reward of the
agent. Our work is different to [Huang et al., 2017] in sev-
eral aspects, including 1) we introduce a strategically-timed
attack, which can reach the same effect of the uniform attack
by attacking the agent four times less often on average; 2)
we also introduce an enchanting attack tactic, which is the
first planning-based adversarial attack to misguide the agent
toward a target state.
In terms of defending DNNs from adversarial attacks, sev-
eral approaches were recently proposed. [Goodfellow et al.,
2015] augmented the training data with adversarial exam-
ples to improve DNNs’ robustness to adversarial examples.
[Zheng et al., 2016] proposed incorporating a stability term to
the objective function, encouraging DNNs to generate similar
outputs for various perturbed versions of an image. Defensive
distillation is proposed in [Papernot et al., 2016b] for training
a network to defend both the L-BFGS attack in [Szegedy et
al., 2014] and the fast gradient sign attack in [Goodfellow et
al., 2015]. Interestingly, as anti-adversarial attack approaches
were proposed, stronger adversarial attack approaches also
emerged. [Carlini and Wagner, 2016] recently introduced a
way to construct adversarial examples that is immune to var-
ious anti-adversarial attack methods, including defensive dis-
tillation. A study in [Rozsa et al., 2016] showed that more
accurate models tend to be more robust to adversarial exam-
ples, while adversarial examples that can fool a more accu-
rate model can also fool a less accurate model. As the study
of adversarial attack to deep RL agents is still in its infancy,
we are unaware of earlier works on the anti-adversarial attack
to deep RL agents.
3 Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we will first review the adversarial example
attack to DNN-based classification systems. We will then
generalize the attack to deep RL agents and introduce our
strategically-timed and enchanting attacks.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let x be an image and f be a DNN. An adversarial exam-
ple to the DNN can be crafted through solving the following
optimization problem:
min
δ
DI(x, x+ δ)
subject to f(x) 6= f(x+ δ), (1)
whereDI is an image similarity metric. In words, it looks for
a minimal perturbation, δ, of an image that can change the
class assignment of the DNN to the image.
s25 s84 𝜹+ =
action taken: up action taken: down
𝛽
Figure 1: Illustration of the strategically-timed attack on Pong. We use a function c to compute the preference of the agent
in taking the most preferred action over the least preferred action at the current state st. A large preference value implies an
immediate reward. In the bottom panel, we plot c(st). Our proposed strategically-timed attack launch an attack to a deep RL
agent when the preference is greater than or equal to a threshold, c(st) ≥ β (red-dash line). When a small perturbation is added
to the observation at s84 (where c(s84) ≥ β), the agent changes its action from up to down and eventually misses the ball. But
when the perturbation is added to the observation at s25 (where c(s25) < β), there is no impact to the reward.
An RL agent learns to interact with the environment
through the rewards signal. At each time step, it performs an
action based on the observation of the environment for max-
imizing the accumulated future rewards. The action determi-
nation is through a policy pi, which maps an observation to
an action. Let the current time step be t, the goal of an RL
algorithm is then to learn a policy that maximizes the accu-
mulated future rewards Rt = rt + rt+1 + ... + rL, where L
is the length of an episode.
In a deep RL algorithm, the policy pi is modeled through
a DNN. An adversary can attack an agent trained by the
deep RL algorithm by perturbing the observations (through
crafting an adversarial example) to make the agent take non-
preferred actions that can result in reduction of the accumu-
lated future rewards.
3.2 Adversarial Attacks on RL
In a recent paper, [Huang et al., 2017] propose the uniform
attack tactic where the adversary attacks a deep RL agent at
every time step, by perturbing each image the agent observes.
The perturbation to an image is computed by using the fast
gradient sign method [Goodfellow et al., 2015]. The uniform
attack tactic is regarded as a direct extension of the adver-
sarial attack on a DNN-based classification system, since the
adversarial example at each time step is computed indepen-
dently of the adversarial examples at other time steps.
It does not consider several unique aspects of the RL prob-
lem. For example, during learning, an RL agent is never
told which actions to take but instead discovers which actions
yield the most reward. This is in contrast to the classification
problem where each image has a ground truth class. More-
over, an adversarial attack to a DNN is considered a success
if it makes the DNN outputs any wrong class. But the success
of an adversarial attack on an RL agent is measured based on
the amount of reward that the adversary takes away from the
RL agent. Instead of perturbing the image to make the agent
takes any non-optimal action, we would like to find a pertur-
bation that makes the agent takes an action that can reduce
most reward. Also, because the reward signal in many RL
problems is sparse, an adversary need not attack the RL agent
at every time step. Our strategically-timed attack tactic de-
scribed in Section 3.3 leverages these unique characteristics
to attack deep RL agents.
Another unique characteristic of the RL problem is that
each action taken by the agent influenced its future obser-
vations. Therefore, an adversary could plan a sequence of
adversarial examples to maliciously lure the agent toward a
certain state that can lead to a catastrophic outcome. Our en-
chanting attack tactic described in Section 3.4 leverages this
characteristic to attack RL agents.
3.3 Strategically-Timed Attack
In an episode, an RL agent observes a sequence of obser-
vations or states {s1, ..., sL}. Instead of attacking at every
time step in an episode, the strategically-timed attack selects
a subset of time steps to attack the agent. Let {δ1, ..., δL} be
a sequence of perturbations. LetR1 be the expected return at
the first time step. We can formulate the above intuition as an
optimization problem as follows:
min
b1,b2,...,bL,δ1,δ2,...,δL
R1(s¯1, ..., s¯L)
s¯t = st + btδt for all t = 1, ..., L
bt ∈ {0, 1}, for all t = 1, ..., L∑
t
bt ≤ Γ (2)
The binary variables b1, ..., bL denote when an adversarial ex-
ample is applied. If bt = 1, the perturbation δt is applied.
Otherwise, we do not alter the state. The total number of at-
tacks is limited by the constant Γ. In words, the adversary
minimizes the expected accumulated reward by strategically
attacking less than Γ << L time steps.
The optimization problem in (2) is a mixed integer pro-
gramming problem, which is difficult to solve. Moreover, in
an RL problem, the observation at time step t depends on
all the previous observations, which makes the development
of a solver to (2) even more challenging since the problem
size grows exponentially with L. In order to study adversar-
ial attack to deep RL agents, we bypass these limitations and
propose a heuristic algorithm to compute {b1, ..., bL} (solv-
ing the when-to-attack problem) and {δ1, ..., δL} (solving the
how-to-attack problem), respectively. In the following, we
first discuss our solution to the when-to-attack problem. We
then discuss our solution to the how-to-attack problem.
When to Attack
We introduce a relative action preference function c for solv-
ing the when-to-attack problem. The function c computes the
preference of the agent in taking the most preferred action
over the least preferred action at the current state st (similar
to [massoud Farahmand, 2011]). The degree of preference to
an action depends on the DNN policy. A large c value im-
plies that the agent strongly prefers one action over the other.
In the case of Pong, when the ball is about to drop from the
top of the screen (see s84 in Fig. 1), a well-trained RL agent
would strongly prefer an up action over a down action. But
when the ball is far away from the paddle (see s25 in Fig. 1),
the agent has no preference on any actions, resulting a small
c value. We describe how to design the relative action pref-
erence function c for attacking the agents trained by the A3C
and DQN algorithms below.
For policy gradient-based methods such as the A3C algo-
rithm, if the action distribution of a well-trained agent is uni-
form at state st, it means that taking any action is equally
good. But, when an agent strongly prefer a specific action
(The action has a relative high probability.), it means that it
is critical to perform the action; otherwise the accumulated
reward will be reduced. Based on this intuition, we define the
c function as
c(st) = max
at
pi(st, at)−min
at
pi(st, at). (3)
where pi is the policy network which maps a state–action pair
(st, at) to a probability, representing the likelihood that the
action at is chosen. In our strategically-timed attack, the ad-
versary attacks the deep RL agent at time step t when the
relative action preference function c has a value greater a
threshold parameter β. In other words, bt = 1 if and only
if c(st) ≥ β. We note the β parameter controls how often it
attacks the RL agent and is related to Γ.
For value-based methods such as DQN, the same intuition
applies. We can convert the computed Q-values of actions
into a probability distribution over actions using the softmax
function (similar to [Huang et al., 2017]) with the temperature
constant T .
c(st) = max
at
e
Q(st,at)
T∑
ak
e
Q(st,ak)
T
−min
at
e
Q(st,at)
T∑
ak
e
Q(st,ak)
T
. (4)
How to Attack
To craft an adversarial example at time step δt, we search for
a perturbation to be added to the observation that can change
the preferred action of the agent from the originally (before
applying the perturbation) most preferred one to the origi-
nally least preferred one. We use the attack method intro-
duced in [Carlini and Wagner, 2016] where we treat the least-
preferred action as the misclassification target (see Sec. 4.1
for details). This approach allows us to leverage the output of
a trained deep RL agent as cue to craft effective adversarial
example for reducing accumulated rewards.
3.4 Enchanting Attack
The goal of the enchanting attack is to lure the deep RL agent
from current state st at time step t to a specified target state
sg after H steps. The adversary needs to craft a series of
adversarial examples st+1 + δt+1, ..., st+H + δt+H for this
attack. The enchanting attack is therefore more challenging
than the strategically-timed attack.
We break this challenging task into two subtasks. In the
first subtask, we assume that we have full control of the agent
to take arbitrary actions at each step. Hence, the task is re-
duced to planning a sequence of actions for reaching the tar-
get state sg from current state st. In the second subtask, we
craft an adversarial example st + δt to lure an agent to take
the first action of planned action sequence using the method
introduced in [Carlini and Wagner, 2016]. After the agent
observes the adversarial example and takes the first action
planned by the adversary, the environment will return a new
state st+1. We progressively craft st+1 + δt+1, ..., st+H +
δt+H , one at a time, using the same procedure described in
(Fig. 2) to lure the agent from state st+1 to the target state
sg . Next, we describe an on-line planing algorithm, which
makes use of a next frame prediction model, for generating
the planned action sequence.
Future State Prediction and Evaluation
We train a video prediction model M to predict a future state
given a sequence of actions based on [Oh et al., 2015], which
used a generative model to predict a video frame in the future:
sMt+H = M(st, At:t+H) , (5)
where At:t+H = {at, ..., at+H} is the given sequence of H
future actions beginning at step t, st is the current state, and
sMt+H is the predicted future state. For more details about the
video prediction model, please refer to the original paper.
The series of actions At:t+H = {at, ..., at+H} take the
agent to reach the state sMt+H . Since the goal of the enchant-
ing attack is to reach the target state sg , we can evaluate the
success of the attack based on the distance between sg and
sMt+H , which is given by D(sg, s
M
t+H). The distance D is re-
alized using the L2-norm in our experiments. We note that
other metrics can be applied as well. We also note that the
state is given by the observed image by the agent.
Sampling-Based Action Planning
We use a sampling-based cross-entropy method ( [Rubinstein
and Kroese, 2013]) to compute a sequence of actions to steer
the RL agent toward our target state. Specifically, we sam-
ple N action sequences of length H: {Ant:t+H}Nn=1, and rank
video prediction model
adversary
unlabeled video
possible sequence of actions adversarial example
agent
Environment
st
st+1
st
at
+
target state
training model planning
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
input
crafting 𝜹
Figure 2: Illustration of Enchanting Attack on Ms.Pacman. The blue panel on the right shows the flow of the attack starting at
st: (1) action sequence planning, (2) crafting an adversarial example with a target-action, (3) the agent takes an action, and (4)
environment generates the next state st+1. The green panel at the left depicts that the video prediction model is trained from
unlabeled video. The white panel in the middle depicts the adversary starts at st and utilize the prediction model to plan the
attack.
each of them based on the distance between the final state
obtained after performing the action sequence and the target
state sg . After that, we keep the best K action sequences
and refit our categorical distributions to them. In our experi-
ments, the hyper-parameter values are N = 2000, K = 400,
and J = 5.
At the end of the last iteration, we set the sampled action
sequence A∗t:t+H that results in a final state that is closest to
our target state sg as our plan. Then, we craft an adversar-
ial example with the target-action a∗t using the method in-
troduced in [Carlini and Wagner, 2016]. Instead of directly
crafting the next adversarial example with target-action a∗t+1,
we plan for another enchanting attack starting at state st+1 to
be robust to potential failure in the previous attack.
We note that the state-transition model is different to the
policy of the deep RL agent. We use the state-transition
model to propose a sequence of actions that we want the deep
RL agent to follow. We also note that both the state-transition
model and the future frame prediction model M are learned
without assuming any information from the RL agent.
4 Experiments
We evaluated our tactics of adversarial attack to deep RL
agents on 5 different Atari 2600 games (i.e., MsPacman,
Pong, Seaquest, Qbert, and ChopperCommand) using Ope-
nAI Gym [Brockman et al., 2016]. These games represents a
balanced collection. Deep RL agents can achieve an above-
human level performance when playing Pong and a below-
human level performance when playing Ms.Pacman. We dis-
cuss our experimental setup and results in details. Our imple-
mentation will be released.
4.1 Experimental Setup
For each game, the deep RL agents were trained using the
state-of-the-art deep RL algorithms including the A3C and
DQN algorithms. For the agents trained by the A3C algo-
rithm, we used the same pre-processing steps and neural net-
work architecture as in [Mnih et al., 2016]. For the agents
trained by the DQN algorithm, we also used the same network
architecture for the Q-function as in the original paper [Mnih
et al., 2015]. The input to the neural network at time twas the
concatenation of the last 4 images. Each of the images was
resized to 84×84. The pixel value was rescaled to [0, 1]. The
output of the policy was a distribution over possible actions
for A3C, and an estimate of Q values for DQN.
Although several existing methods can be used to
craft an adversarial example (e.g., the fast gradient sign
method [Goodfellow et al., 2015], and Jacobian-based
saliency map attack [Papernot et al., 2016a]), anti-adversarial
attack measures were also discovered to limit their impact
[Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016b]. We adopted
an adversarial example crafting method proposed by [Carlini
and Wagner, 2016], which can break several existing anti-
adversarial attack methods. Specifically, it crafts an adversar-
ial example by approximately optimizing (1) where the image
similarity metric was given by L∞ norm. We early stopped
the optimizer when D(s, s+ δ) < , where  is a small value
set to 0.007. The value of temperature T in Equation (4) is
set to 1 in the experiments.
4.2 Strategically-Timed Attack
For each game and for the agents trained by the DQN and
A3C algorithms, we launched the strategically-timed attack
using different β values. Each β value rendered a different at-
tack rate, quantifying how often an adversary attacked an RL
agent in an episode. We computed the collected rewards by
the agents under different attack rates. The results are shown
in Fig. 3 where the y-axis is the accumulated reward and the
x-axis is the average portion of time steps in an episode that
an adversary attacks the agent (i.e., the attack rate). We show
the lowest attack rate where the reward reaches the the re-
(a) Pong (b) Seaquest (c) MsPacman (d) ChopperCommand (e) Qbert
Figure 3: Accumulated reward (y-axis) v.s. Portions of time steps the agent is attacked (x-axis) of Strategically-timed Attack
in 5 games. The blue and green curves correspond to results of A3C and DQN, respectively. A larger reward means the deep
RL agent is more robust to the strategically-timed attack.
(a) Pong (b) Seaquest (c) MsPacman (d) ChopperCommand (e) Qbert
Figure 4: Success rate (y-axis) v.s. H steps in the future (x-axis) for Enchanting Attack in 5 games. The blue and green
curves correspond to results of A3C and DQN, respectively. A lower rate means that the deep RL agent is more robust to the
enchanting attack.
ward of uniform attack. From the figure, we found that on
average the strategically-timed attack can reach the same ef-
fect of the uniform attack by attacking 25% of the time steps
in an episode. We also found an agent trained using the DQN
algorithm was more vulnerable than an agent trained with the
A3C algorithm in most games except Pong. Since the A3C al-
gorithm is known to perform better than the DQN algorithm
in the Atari games, this result suggests that a stronger deep
RL agent may be more robust to the adversarial attack. This
finding, to some extent, echoes the finding in [Rozsa et al.,
2016], which suggested that a stronger DNN-based recogni-
tion system is more robust to the adversarial attack.
4.3 Enchanting Attack
The goal of the enchanting attack is to maliciously lure the
agent toward a target state. In order to avoid the bias of defin-
ing target states manually, we synthesized target states ran-
domly. Firstly, we let the agent to apply its policy by t steps
to reach an initial state st and saved this state into a snap-
shot. Secondly, we randomly sampled a sequence of actions
of length H and consider the state reached by the agent af-
ter performing these actions as a synthesized target state sg .
After recording the target state, we restored the snapshot and
run the enchanting attack on the agent and compared the nor-
malized Euclidean distance between the target state sg and
the final reached state st+H where the normalization constant
was given by the image resolution.
We considered an attack was successful if the final state
had a normalized Euclidean distance to the target state within
a tolerance value of 1. To make sure the evaluation was not
affected by different stages of the game, we set 10 initial time
step t equals to [0.0, 0.1, ..., 0.9] × L, where L was the av-
erage length of the game episode played by the RL agents
10 times. For each initial time step, we evaluated different
H = [1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120]. Then, for eachH , we
computed the success rate (i.e., number of times the adversary
misguided the agent to reach the target state divided by num-
ber of trials). We expected that a largerH would correspond a
more difficult enchanting attack problem. In Fig. 4, we show
the success rate (y-axis) as a function of H in 5 games. We
found that the agents trained by both the A3C and DQN algo-
rithms were enchanted. When H < 40, the success rate was
more than 70% in several games (except Seaquest and Chop-
perCommand). The reason that enchanting attack was less ef-
fective on Seaquest and ChopperCommand was because both
of the games include multiple random enemies such that our
trained video prediction models were less accurate.
5 Conclusion
We introduced two novel tactics of adversarial attack on deep
RL agents: the strategically-timed attack and the enchanting
attack. In five Atari games, we showed that the accumulated
rewards collected by the agents trained using the DQN and
A3C algorithms were significantly reduced when they were
attacked by the strategically-timed attack even with just 25%
of the time steps in an episode. Our enchanting attack com-
bining video prediction and planning can lure deep RL agent
toward maliciously defined target states in 40 steps with more
than 70% success rate in 3 out of 5 games. In the future, we
plan to develop a more sophisticated strategically-timed at-
tack method. We also plan to improve video prediction accu-
racy of the generative model for improving the success rate
of enchanting attack on more complicated games.
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